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Abstract
Quantum strategies have been successfully applied in game the-
ory for years. However, as a reverse problem of game theory, the
theory of mechanism design is ignored by physicists. In this pa-
per, we generalize the classical theory of mechanism design to
a quantum domain and obtain two results: 1) We find that the
mechanism in the proof of Maskin’s sufficiency theorem is built
on the Prisoners’ Dilemma. 2) By virtue of a quantum mecha-
nism, agents who satisfy a certain condition can combat Pareto-
inefficient social choice rules instead of being restricted by the
traditional mechanism design theory.
1 Introduction
Game theory is a very useful tool for investigating rational de-
cision making in conflict situations. It was first founded by von
Neumann and Morgenstern [1]. Since its beginning, game theory
has been widely applied to many disciplines, such as economics,
politics, biologies and so on. Compared with game theory, the
theory of mechanism design just concerns the reverse question:
given some desirable outcomes, can we design a game that pro-
duces it? The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel 2007 was awarded jointly to Hurwicz,
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Maskin and Myerson for having laid the foundations of mecha-
nism design theory.
As Serrano [2] has described, we suppose that the goals of a
group of self-interested agents (or a society) can be summarized
in a social choice rule (SCR). An SCR is a mapping that pre-
scribes the social outcome (or outcomes) on the basis of agents’
preferences over the set of all social outcomes [3]. The theory
of mechanism design answers the important question of whether
and how it is possible to implement different SCRs. According
to Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m [4], whether or not an SCR is imple-
mentable depend on which game theoretic solution concept is
used (e.g., dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium). Ref. [3] is
a fundamental work in the field of mechanism design. It provides
an almost complete characterization of social choice rules that
are Nash implementable.
In 1999, some pioneering breakthroughs were made in the field
of quantum games [5,6]. The game proposed by Eisert et al [5]
showed a fascinating “quantum advantages” as a result of a novel
quantum Nash equilibrium. Benjamin and Hayden [7], Du et al
[8], Flitney and Hollenberg [9] investigated multiplayer quantum
Prisoners’ Dilemma. As a comparison, so far the theory of mech-
anism design is still investigated only by economists. To our best
knowledge, up to now, there is no research in the cross field be-
tween quantum mechanics and mechanism design. Motivated by
quantum games, in this paper, we will investigate what happens
if agents can use quantum strategies in the theory of mechanism
design.
Section 2 of this paper recalls some preliminaries of mechanism
design published in Ref. [2], while Section 3 reformulates the well-
known Maskin mechanism as a physical mechanism and proves
they are equivalent to each other. Section 4 generalizes the phys-
ical mechanism to a quantum domain and proves that under a
certain condition, an original Nash implementable social choice
rule will no longer be implemented. Section 5 draws the conclu-
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sions.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, · · · , n} be a finite set of agents with n ≥ 2, A =
{a1, · · · , ak} be a finite set of social outcomes. Let Ti be the finite
set of agent i’s types, and the private information possessed by
agent i is denoted as ti ∈ Ti. We refer to a profile of types t =
(t1, · · · , tn) as a state. Let T = ∏i∈N Ti be the set of states. At
state t ∈ T , each agent i ∈ N is assumed to have a complete
and transitive preference relation ºti over the set A. We denote
by ºt= (ºt1, · · · ,ºtn) the profile of preferences in state t. The
utility of agent i for outcome a in state t is ui(a, t) : A×T → R,
i.e., ui(a, t) ≥ ui(b, t) if and only if a ºti b. We denote by Âti
the strict preference part of ºti. Fix a state t, we refer to the
collection E =< N,A, (ºti)i∈N > as an environment. Let ε be
the class of possible environments. A social choice rule (SCR) F
is a mapping F : ε → 2A\{∅}. A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g)
describes a message or strategy setMi for agent i, and an outcome
function g :
∏
i∈N Mi → A.
An SCR F satisfies no-veto if, whenever a ºti b for all b ∈ A
and for all agents i but perhaps one j, then a ∈ F (E). An SCR
F is monotonic if for every pair of environments E and E ′, and
for every a ∈ F (E), whenever a ºti b implies that a ºt′i b, there
holds a ∈ F (E ′). We assume that there is complete information
among the agents, i.e., the true state t is common knowledge
among them. Given a mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) played in
state t, a Nash equilibrium of Γ in state t is a strategy profile
m∗ such that: ∀i ∈ N, g(m∗(t)) ºti g(mi,m∗−i(t)),∀mi ∈ Mi. Let
N (Γ, t) denote the set of Nash equilibria of the game induced by
Γ in state t, and g(N (Γ, t)) denote the corresponding set of Nash
equilibrium outcomes. An SCR F is Nash implementable if there
exists a mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) such that for every t ∈ T ,
g(N (Γ, t)) = F (t).
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Maskin [3] provided an almost complete characterization of social
choice rules that were Nash implementable. The main results of
Ref. [3] are two theorems: 1) (Necessity) If an SCR F is Nash
implementable, then it is monotonic. 2) (Sufficiency) Let n ≥ 3,
if an SCR F is monotonic and satisfies no-veto, then it is Nash
implementable. In order to facilitate the following investigation
on quantum mechanism, we briefly recall the Maskin mechanism
as follows [2]:
Consider the following mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g), where agent
i’s message set is Mi = A × T × Z+. A typical message sent by
agent i is described as mi = (ai, ti, zi). The outcome function
g is defined in the following three rules: (1) If for every agent
i ∈ N , mi = (a, t, 0) and a ∈ F (t), then g(m) = a. (2) If (n− 1)
agents i 6= j send mi = (a, t, 0) and a ∈ F (t), but agent j sends
mj = (aj, tj, zj) 6= (a, t, 0), then g(m) = a if aj Âtj a, and g(m) =
aj otherwise. (3) In all other cases, g(m) = a
′, where a′ is the
outcome chosen by the agent with the lowest index among those
who announce the highest integer.
3 Physical mechanism
It can be seen that in the Maskin mechanism, a message is an
abstract mathematical notion. People usually neglect how it is
realized physically. However, the world is a physical world. Any
information must be related to a physical entity. Here we assume:
1) Each agent has a coin and a card. The state of a coin can be
head up or tail up (denoted as H and T respectively).
2) Each agent i independently chooses a strategic action ωi whether
to flip his/her coin. The set of agent i’s action is Ωi = {Not flip, F lip}.
An action ωi ∈ Ωi chosen by agent i is defined as ωi : {H,T} →
{H,T}. If ωi = Not flip, then ωi(H) = H, ωi(T ) = T ; If
ωi = Flip, then ωi(H) = T , ωi(T ) = H.
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Fig. 1 The setup of a physical mechanism. Each agent 
has a coin and a card. The state of a coin can be head up 
or tail up. A message is written on one side of a card. 
Each agent independently chooses a strategy whether to 
flip his/her coin. 
Card 2 
Card n
3) The two sides of a card are denoted as Side 0 and Side 1. A
message is written on one side of a card. The message written
on the Side 0 (or Side 1) of card i is denoted as card(i, 0) (or
card(i, 1)).
Based on aforementioned assumptions, we reformulate the Maskin
mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) as a physical mechanism ΓP =
((Si)i∈N , G), where Si = Ωi × Ci, Ci is agent i’s card set, Ci =
A × T × Z+ × A × T × Z+. A typical card written by agent
i is described as ci = (card(i, 0), card(i, 1)), where card(i, 0) =
(ai, ti, zi), card(i, 1) = (a
′
i, t
′
i, z
′
i). A physical mechanism Γ
P =
((Si)i∈N , G) describes a strategy set Si for agent i and an outcome
function G :
∏
i∈N Si → A. We shall use S−i to express ∏j 6=i Sj,
and thus, a strategy profile is s = (si, s−i), where si = (ωi, ci) ∈ Si
and s−i = (ω−i, c−i) ∈ S−i. A Nash equilibrium of ΓP played in
state t is a strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s∗n) such that for any
agent i ∈ N , si ∈ Si, G(s∗1, · · · , s∗n) ºti G(si, s∗−i). Fig. 1 depicts
the setup of a physical mechanism. From the viewpoint of the
designer, the physical mechanism works in the same manner as
the Maskin mechanism does. The working steps of the physical
mechanism are as follows:
Step 1: Nature selects a state t ∈ T and assigns t to the agents.
Each coin is set head up.
Step 2: In state t, if all agents agree that the social choice rule F
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is Pareto-inefficient, i.e., there exists tˆ ∈ T , tˆ 6= t, aˆ ∈ F (tˆ) such
that aˆ ºti a ∈ F (t) for every i ∈ N , and aˆ Âtj a ∈ F (t) for at
least one j ∈ N , then goto Step 4.
Step 3: Each agent i sets ci = ((ai, ti, zi), (ai, ti, zi)) (where ai ∈ A,
ti ∈ T , zi ∈ Z+ the set of nonnegative integers), ωi = Not flip,
mi = card(i, 0). Goto step 5.
Step 4: Each agent i sets ci = ((aˆ, tˆ, 0), (ai, ti, zi)), then chooses a
strategic action ωi ∈ Ωi whether to flip coin i, and sends card(i, 0)
(or card(i, 1)) as mi to the designer if coin i is head up (or tail
up).
Step 5: The designer receives the overall messagem = (m1, · · · ,mn)
and let the final outcomeG(s) = g(m) using rule 1, 2 and 3. END.
Proposition 1: Given an SCR F and a state t ∈ T , N (ΓP , t) is
equivalent to N (Γ, t).
Proof: First, for s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s∗n) ∈ N (ΓP , t) and a = G(s∗).
Define a function R : {H,T} → {0, 1}, R(H) = 0, R(T ) = 1. If
a is generated by step 4 and 5, then for each agent i, let m∗i =
card(i, R(ω∗i (H))); if a is generated by step 3 and 5, then for each
agent i, let m∗i = card(i, 0). Obviously, m
∗ = (m∗1, · · · ,m∗n) ∈
N (Γ, t).
Next, for m∗ = (m∗1, · · · ,m∗n) ∈ N (Γ, t). For each agent i, let
s∗i = (ω
∗
i , c
∗
i ), where ω
∗
i = Not flip, c
∗
i = (m
∗
i ,m
∗
i ), then s
∗ =
(s∗1, · · · , s∗n) ∈ N (ΓP , t). Q.E.D.
Example 1: Let N = {Apple, Lily, Cindy}, T = {t1, t2}, A =
{a1, a2, a3, a4}. In each state t ∈ T , the preference relations (ºti
)i∈N over the outcome set A and the corresponding SCR F are
given in Table I. Obviously, F is monotonic and satisfies no-
veto. By Maskin’s theorem, F is Nash implementable. The SCR
F is Pareto-inefficient from the viewpoint of the agents because
in state t = t2, all agents unanimously prefer a Pareto optimal
outcome a1 ∈ F (t1): for each agent i, a1 Ât2i a2 ∈ F (t2). Therefore
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Table 1
An example of a Pareto-inefficient SCR.
State t1 State t2
Apple Lily Cindy Apple Lily Cindy
a3 a2 a1 a4 a3 a1
a1 a1 a3 a1 a1 a2
a2 a4 a2 a2 a2 a3
a4 a3 a4 a3 a4 a4
F (t1) = {a1} F (t2) = {a2}
when the true state is t2, the physical mechanism enters Step 4.
Since aˆ = a1 is Pareto optimal in state t2, it seems that (aˆ, tˆ, 0) =
(a1, t1, 0) and “Not flip” should be a unanimous card(i, 0) and an
strategic action chosen by each agent i. However, Apple has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate from (a1, t1, 0) to (a4, ∗, ∗) by
flipping her coin, since a1 ÂtˆApple a4, a4 ÂtApple a1; Lily also has
an incentive to unilaterally deviate from (a1, t1, 0) to (a3, ∗, ∗) by
flipping her coin, since a1 ÂtˆLily a3, a3 ÂtLily a1. Cindy has no
incentive to deviate from (aˆ, tˆ, 0) because a1 is her top-ranked
outcome in two states. Therefore, cApple = ((a1, t1, 0), (a4, ∗, ∗)),
cLily = ((a1, t1, 0), (a3, ∗, ∗)), cCindy = ((a1, t1, 0), (a1, t1, 0)).
Note that either Apple or Lily can certainly obtain her expected
outcome only if just one of them flips her coin and deviates from
(aˆ, tˆ, 0) (If this case happens, rule 2 would be triggered). But
this assumption is unreasonable, because all agents are rational,
nobody is willing to give up and let the others benefit. Therefore,
both Apple and Lily will flip their coins and deviate from (aˆ, tˆ, 0).
As a result, rule 3 will be triggered. Since Apple and Lily both
have a chance to win the integer game, the winner is uncertain.
Consequently, the final outcome is uncertain between a3 and a4,
denoted as a3/a4.
To sum up, in state t = t2, the dominant strategic action for
Apple and Lily is Flip, which results in an uncertain outcome
a3/a4. Even if the uncertain outcome is not preferred by each
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agent, it will always happen according to the mechanism in the
proof of Maskin’s sufficiency theorem. The underlying reason
is just the same as what we have seen in the famous Prison-
ers’ Dilemma, i.e., the individual rationality is in conflict with
the group rationality. In this sense, the agents cannot combat a
Pareto-inefficient SCR under classical physical circumstances.
4 Quantum mechanism
In 2007, Flitney and Hollenberg [9] investigated Nash equilibria
in n-player quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma. Following their proce-
dures, we define:
ωˆ(θ, φ) ≡
e
iφ cos(θ/2) i sin(θ/2)
i sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)
 ,
Ωˆ ≡ {ωˆ(θ, φ) : θ ∈ [0, pi], φ ∈ [0, pi/2]}, Jˆ ≡ cos(γ/2)Iˆ⊗n +
i sin(γ/2)σˆx
⊗n, where γ is an entanglement measure. Iˆ ≡ ωˆ(0, 0),
Dˆn ≡ ωˆ(pi, pi/n), Cˆn ≡ ωˆ(0, pi/n).
In order to generalize the physical mechanism to a quantum do-
main, we revise the assumption 1 and 2 of the physical mechanism
as follows:
1) Each agent i has a quantum coin i (qubit) and a classical card
i. The basis vectors |C〉 ≡ (1, 0)T , |D〉 ≡ (0, 1)T of a quantum
coin denote head up and tail up respectively.
2) Each agent i independently performs a local unitary operation
on his/her own quantum coin. The set of agent i’s operation
is Ωˆi = Ωˆ. A strategic operation chosen by agent i is denoted
as ωˆi ∈ Ωˆi. If ωˆi = Iˆ, then ωˆi(|C〉) = |C〉, ωˆi(|D〉) = |D〉; If
ωˆi = Dˆn, then ωˆi(|C〉) = |D〉, ωˆi(|D〉) = |C〉. Iˆ denotes “Not
flip”, Dˆn denotes “Flip”.
In addition, we assume there is a device that can measure the
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Fig. 2 The setup of a quantum mechanism. Each agent 
has a quantum coin and a card. A message is written on 
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state of n quantum coins and return the collapsed state to the
agents. Based on aforementioned assumptions, we generalize the
physical mechanism ΓP = ((Si)i∈N , G) to a quantum mechanism
ΓQ = ((Sˆi)i∈N , Gˆ), where Sˆi = Ωˆi × Ci. A quantum mechanism
ΓQ = ((Sˆi)i∈N , Gˆ) describes a strategy set Sˆi for agent i and
an outcome function Gˆ : ⊗i∈N Ωˆi × ∏i∈N Ci → A. We shall use
Sˆ−i to express ⊗j 6=iΩˆj × ∏j 6=iCj, and thus, a strategy profile is
sˆ = (sˆi, sˆ−i), where sˆi ∈ Sˆi and sˆ−i ∈ Sˆ−i. A Nash equilibrium
of a quantum mechanism ΓQ played in state t is a strategy pro-
file sˆ∗ = (sˆ∗1, · · · , sˆ∗n) such that for any agent i ∈ N , sˆi ∈ Sˆi,
Gˆ(sˆ∗1, · · · , sˆ∗n) ºti Gˆ(sˆi, sˆ∗−i). Fig. 2 depicts the setup of a quan-
tum mechanism. Its working steps are as follows:
Step 1: Nature selects a state t ∈ T and assigns t to the agents.
The state of every quantum coin is set as |C〉. |ψ0〉 = |C · · ·CC〉.
Step 2: In state t, if all agents agree that the social choice rule F
is Pareto-inefficient, i.e., there exists tˆ ∈ T , tˆ 6= t, aˆ ∈ F (tˆ) such
that aˆ ºti a ∈ F (t) for every i ∈ N , and aˆ Âtj a ∈ F (t) for at
least one j ∈ N , then goto step 4.
Step 3: Each agent i sets ci = ((ai, ti, zi), (ai, ti, zi)) (where ai ∈ A,
ti ∈ T , zi ∈ Z+), ωˆi = Iˆ, and sends card(i, 0) as mi to the
designer. Goto step 8.
Step 4: Each agent i sets ci = ((aˆ, tˆ, 0), (ai, ti, zi)). Let n quantum
coins be entangled by Jˆ . |ψ1〉 = Jˆ |C · · ·CC〉.
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Step 5: Each agent i independently performs a local unitary op-
eration ωˆi on his/her own quantum coin. |ψ2〉 = [ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗
ωˆn]Jˆ |C · · ·CC〉.
Step 6: Let n quantum coins be disentangled by Jˆ+. |ψ3〉 =
Jˆ+[ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn]Jˆ |C · · ·CC〉.
Step 7: The device measures the state of n quantum coins and
returns the collapsed state to the agents. Each agent i sends
card(i, 0) (or card(i, 1)) asmi to the designer if the state of quan-
tum coin i is |C〉 (or |D〉).
Step 8: The designer receives the overall messagem = (m1, · · · ,mn)
and let the final outcome Gˆ(sˆ) = g(m) using rule 1, 2 and 3. END.
Note that if Ωˆi is restricted to be {Iˆ , Dˆn}, then Ωˆi is equiva-
lent to {Not flip, F lip}. In this way, a quantum mechanism is
degenerated to a physical mechanism.
Given n (n ≥ 3) agents, consider the payoff to the n-th agent, we
denote by $C···CC the expected payoff when all agents choose Iˆ
(the corresponding collapsed state is |C · · ·CC〉), and denote by
$C···CD the expected payoff when the n-th agent chooses Dˆn and
the first n− 1 agents choose Iˆ (the corresponding collapsed state
is |C · · ·CD〉). $D···DD and $D···DC are defined similarly. Different
from Flitney and Hollenberg’s requirements on the payoffs, for
the case of quantum mechanism, the requirements on the payoffs
are described as condition λ:
1) λ1: Given an SCR F and a state t, if there exists tˆ ∈ T , tˆ 6= t,
aˆ ∈ F (tˆ) such that aˆ ºti a ∈ F (t) for every i ∈ N , and aˆ Âtj
a ∈ F (t) for at least one j ∈ N , then in going from state tˆ to t,
there exist at least two agents that encounter a preference change
around aˆ. Denote by l the number of these agents. Without loss of
generality, let these l agents be the last l agents among n agents.
2) λ2: Consider the payoff to the n-th agent, $C···CC > $D···DD,
i.e., he/she prefers the expected payoff of a certain outcome (gen-
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erated by rule 1) to the expected payoff of an uncertain outcome
(generated by rule 3).
3) λ3: Consider the payoff to the n-th agent, $C···CC > $C···CD[1−
sin2 γ sin2(pi/l)] + $D···DC sin2 γ sin2(pi/l).
Proposition 2: For n ≥ 3, given a state t ∈ T and a Pareto-
inefficient SCR F (from the viewpoint of agents) that is mono-
tonic and satisfies no-veto, by virtue of a quantum mechanism
ΓQ = ((Sˆi)i∈N , Gˆ), agents satisfying condition λ can combat the
Pareto-inefficient SCR F .
Proof: Given a state t ∈ T , if an SCR F specified by the designer
is Pareto-inefficient, then there exists tˆ ∈ T , tˆ 6= t, aˆ ∈ F (tˆ) such
that aˆ ºti a ∈ F (t) for every i ∈ N , and aˆ Âtj a ∈ F (t) for
at least one j ∈ N . Hence, the quantum mechanism enters step
4. Since condition λ1 is satisfied, according to Ref. [9], consider
the payoff to the n-th agent (denoted as Laura), when she plays
ωˆ(θ, φ) while the first n − l agents play Iˆ and the middle l − 1
agents play Cˆl:
〈$Laura〉 =$C···CC cos2(θ/2)[1− sin2 γ sin2(φ− pi/l)]
+$C···CD sin2(θ/2)[1− sin2 γ sin2(pi/l)]
+$D···DC sin2(θ/2) sin2 γ sin2(pi/l)
+$D···DD cos2(θ/2) sin2 γ sin2(φ− pi/l)
Since condition λ2 is satisfied, then $C···CC > $D···DD, Laura
chooses φ = pi/l to minimize sin2(φ− pi/l). As a result,
〈$Laura〉 =$C···CC cos2(θ/2)
+$C···CD sin2(θ/2)[1− sin2 γ sin2(pi/l)]
+$D···DC sin2(θ/2) sin2 γ sin2(pi/l)
Since condition λ3 is satisfied, then Laura prefers θ = 0, which
leads to 〈$Laura〉 = $C···CC . In this case, ωˆLaura(θ, φ) = ωˆ(0, pi/l) =
Cˆl.
By symmetry, let sˆ = (ωˆ, c), where ωˆ = (Iˆ , · · · , Iˆ , Cˆl, · · · , Cˆl)
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(the first n− l agents choose Iˆ, the rest l agents choose Cˆl), and
c = (c1, · · · , cn), where ci = ((aˆ, tˆ, 0), (ai, ti, zi)) (i ∈ N), then
sˆ ∈ N (ΓQ, t). In step 7, the corresponding collapsed state of n
quantum coins is |C · · ·CC〉, therefore mi = (aˆ, tˆ, 0) (i ∈ N),
Gˆ(sˆ) = g(m) = aˆ /∈ F (t). Q.E.D.
Let us reconsider Example 1. Since F is Pareto-inefficient, the
quantum mechanism enters step 4. l = 2, condition λ1 is satisfied.
cApple = ((a1, t1, 0), (a4, ∗, ∗)),
cLily = ((a1, t1, 0), (a3, ∗, ∗)),
cCindy = ((a1, t1, 0), (a1, t1, 0)).
Let Cindy be the first agent, for any agent i ∈ {Apple, Lily},
let her be the last agent. Consider the payoff to the n-th agent,
suppose $CCC = 3 (the corresponding outcome is a1), $CCD = 5
(the corresponding outcome is a4 if i = Apple, and a3 if i =
Lily), $DDC = 0 (the corresponding outcome is a3 if i = Apple,
and a4 if i = Lily), $DDD = 1 (the corresponding outcome is
a3/a4). Hence, condition λ2 is satisfied and condition λ3 becomes:
3 ≥ 5[1 − sin2 γ sin2(pi/2)]. If sin2 γ ≥ 0.4, condition λ3 is satis-
fied. According to Proposition 2, the message corresponding to
sˆ∗ ∈ N (ΓQ, t) is m∗ = (m∗1,m∗2,m∗3), where m∗1 = m∗2 = m∗3 =
(a1, t1, 0). Consequently, Gˆ(sˆ
∗) = g(m∗) = a1 /∈ F (t) = {a2}.
To help the reader understand the aforementioned result, let the
SCR in Table 1 be “No smoking”. Let a1 and a2 denote “Smok-
ing” and “No smoking” respectively. Suppose everybody likes
smoking very much in state t2, then the SCR is Pareto-inefficient
to the smoker group. According to the traditional theory of mech-
anism design, the “No smoking” SCR can be Nash implemented
because “No smoking” satisfies monotonicity and no-veto. But
by virtue of quantum strategies, this smoker group can combat
the “No smoking” SCR!
Remark: In Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m [4], the authors used a mod-
ulo game instead of the integer game. The rule 3 is replaced
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by “3) In all other cases, g(m) = aj, for j ∈ N such that
j = (
∑
i∈N zi)(mod n)”. Similar to aforementioned analysis, it
can be derived that the results of this paper still hold.
5 Conclusions
In conclusion, this paper considers what happens if the theory of
mechanism design is quantized. The main results are two folds:
1) The paper proposes that the success of Maskin’s mechanism
is indeed built on an underlying Prisoners’ Dilemma, which may
not be awared clearly by the economic society.
2) Under the classical circumstance, if an SCR satisfies mono-
tonicity and no-veto, then no matter whether it is Pareto-efficient
or not (from the viewpoint of the agents), it can be certainly
Nash implemented. But now, when the additional condition λ is
satisfied, an original Nash implementable Pareto-inefficient SCR
will no longer be Nash implementable in the context of quantum
domain.
Ref. [10] pointed out that in quantum games, quantum strate-
gies just constructed a new game and solved it, not the original
game. However, from the viewpoint of the designer, the inter-
face between agents and the designer in the quantum mechanism
is the same as that in the Maskin mechanism. Therefore, from
the viewpoint of agents, quantum mechanism helps them combat
Pareto-inefficient social choice rules specified by the designer.
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